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Michael W. Horn, the Appellant herein, by and through his 
counsel, L. Zane Gill of the Law Office of L. Zane Gill, P.C., 
respectfully submits the following brief in reply to the 
Appellees' Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPELLANT'S PERCEIVED HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION CLAIM 
WAS TIMELY FILED, THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY 
DISMISSED APPELLANT'S HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION CLAIM. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order dismissing 
the Appellant's perceived handicap discrimination claim. The 
Appellant timely filed his perceived handicap discrimination 
claim as the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to the 
discovery rule. 
It is a well established principle that "[g]enerally, a 
cause of action accrues 'upon the happening of the last event 
necessary to complete the cause of action.'" Berenda v. 
Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996) (quoting Myers v. McDonald, 
635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)). Nevertheless, "in certain 
instances, the discovery rule "may operate to toll the period of 
limitations until the discovery of facts forming the basis for 
the cause of action.'11 Id. 50-51 (quoting Walker Drug Co. v. La 
Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted)). 
As previously noted, there are three circumstances when the 
discovery rule applies. "The discovery rule applies when 
mandated by statute, when a defendant has concealed a plaintiff's 
cause of action, or when exceptional circumstances exist." Id. 
at 51 (citation omitted). Finally, it is critical to note that 
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if the discovery rule does apply, MXthe limitations period does 
not begin to run until discovery of facts forming the basis for 
the cause of action.'" Id. (quoting O'Neal v. Division of Family 
Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted)). 
Thus, in this case the statute of limitations would not begin to 
run until the Appellant had learned of the facts comprising his 
perceived handicap discrimination claim which was in July and 
August of 1994. 
In this case, the Appellant maintains that the discovery 
rule should apply to prevent the running of the statute of 
limitations pursuant to the concealment and exceptional 
circumstances exceptions. However, before the Court may consider 
these exceptions, the party seeking protection of the discovery 
rule must make an initial showing that the party "did not know 
and could not reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the 
cause of action in time to commence an action within that 
period.11 Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P. 2d 1229, 
1231 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). 
A. Horn Did Not Know, Nor Could He Have Reasonably 
Discovered The Facts Underlying His Discrimination 
Cause Of Action. 
The Appellees have argued that Horn should have discovered 
the facts supporting this cause of action prior to the running of 
the statute of limitations. Brief of Appellees at 30. The 
Appellees proffer a laundry list of events which they contend 
should have led Horn to discover that he was perceived as having a 
mental disability. The Appellees note that Horn recognized his 
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deteriorating relationship with his co-workers. Brief of 
Appellant at 11. However, the deterioration of Horn's 
relationship with his colleagues was directly linked to Horn's 
participation in the RFP process. R. 552-56, 527, 532-34. Horn 
objected to the illegal actions taken by his co-worker's and 
insisted on strict compliance with the mandates of Utah law. 
Horn's co-workers, however, had another agenda and Horn was only 
complicating that agenda. Thus, it is not unreasonable for Horn 
not to perceive his deteriorating relationship with his 
colleagues as an indication that he was being perceived as 
mentally disabled. 
Next, the internal affairs investigation that was conducted 
regarding Horn was the direct result of complaints about him by 
Appellee Ertel and the goings on in the RFP Committee. R. 508, 
548-554. Ertel did not like Horn objecting to her actions during 
the RFP process. In fact, Horn was very unhappy with Ertel 
changing his work product without his permission and with Ertel's 
participation in activities that Horn considered to be illegal. 
This caused dissension among these two individuals. This 
conflict between Horn and Ertel did not put Horn on notice that he 
was perceived as having a mental disability by his supervisors 
and peers. In fact, it is unreasonable to assume that mere 
antagonism between co-workers would lead one to believe that he 
was being perceived as having a disability. 
In addition, the fact that Horn was being overworked and was 
suffering from the subsequent stress and pressure of this 
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exertion, does not mean that he should have known that he was 
being perceived as having a mental disability. Merely because 
one may experience stress and pressure from work does not mean 
that others perceive that individual as having a mental 
disability. It certainly is not unreasonable that this did not 
indicate to Horn that his supervisors were perceiving him as an 
individual with a mental disability. 
The Appellees also maintain that Horn should have been aware 
of the Appellees' perception of a mental disability because he 
was banned from one of the floors in the building in which he 
worked. However, again, Horn perceived this ban as directly 
related to his objections to the illegalities that were taking 
place during the RFP process. Horn perceived that he was being 
retaliated against by those of whom he had complained. R. 503. 
Horn's belief in this regard was not unreasonable given the fact 
that prior to the RFP process he had a good relationship with his 
colleagues. R. 552-56. It was not until he started to point out 
the improprieties and the illegalities that were taking place 
during the RFP process that adverse actions were taken against 
Horn. 
The Appellees further argue that Horn should have known that 
he was being perceived as mentally disturbed because Appellee 
Squire had tape recorded a conversation between Squire and Horn. 
It was not unreasonable for Horn not to take the tape recording as 
a cue that he was being perceived as having a mental handicap. 
The conversation that was taped took place after the disastrous 
-4-
annual job run for which Squire wanted to lay total blame on Horn. 
Horn and Squire had had a disagreement over how to proceed during 
the annual job run. R. 511-12, 499-517. It simply does not 
warrant the conclusion that an employee would understand that he 
was being discriminated against on the basis of a perceived 
mental disability because his supervisor tape records a 
conversation between them. And in this case, it was not 
unreasonable that Horn did not reach such a conclusion. 
As to the revocation of Horn's security clearance, again, it 
was not unreasonable for Horn to believe that this took place as 
retaliation for his vigorous participation in the RFP process or 
in retaliation for the circumstances surrounding the failed 
annual job run. By this time, many adverse actions were being 
taken against Horn. It was not unreasonable for Horn to believe 
that the revocation of his security clearance was just another 
action being taken against him for his participation in the RFP 
process. 
Finally, when Horn met with Townsend he was trying to secure 
information to process his grievance. R. 514-15. Townsend tried 
to dissuade Horn from prosecuting the grievance. R. 515. 
Townsend, on the other hand, claims that he reassured Horn that he 
would do all he could to assist Horn but that any information 
needed to be obtained from Townsend. R. 603. It is during this 
meeting that Townsend claims Horn cried. According to the 
Appellees, this fact is supposed to have made Horn aware that he 
was being perceived as mentally disturbed. However, Townsend did 
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not refer Horn to counseling or help despite the existence of a 
program for such assistance. R. 618. If Townsend had done so, 
it would have been reasonable for Horn to know that he was being 
perceived as mentally disabled. 
None of the facts presented in the Appellees' laundry list 
would establish that Horn knew of the pertinent facts underlying 
his perceived handicap discrimination cause of action. Nor does 
this laundry list establish that Horn should have discovered the 
underlying facts prior to the running of the statute of 
limitations. Moreover, even if these items had led Horn's counsel 
to question Appellees during their depositions with regard to a 
potential claim for disability discrimination, the facts 
underlying the cause of action were not discovered until that 
time. "The limitations period is postponed only be belated 
discovery of key facts and not by delayed discovery of legal 
theories." Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 
579 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). Horn did not 
discover the facts underlying this cause of action until the 
deposition testimony was secured in the summer of 1994.1 
1
 The Appellees also argue that the three reasons given 
for Horn's termination should have put him on notice that he was 
being terminated because of a perceived mental disability. 
However, the three reasons given for Horn's termination (that Horn 
was a security threat, that Horn had committed perjury, and that 
Horn had been insubordinate), make no reference to the Appellees' 
belief that Horn was mentally disturbed. See R. 492-93, 494-98. 
Moreover, given the constant retaliation that Horn had suffered, 
it was logical for him to understand that the reasons given were 
tied to that retaliation and not that they were the result of 
illegal discrimination against him. 
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Based on the foregoing, it is evident that Horn has 
established the requisite threshold for consideration of the 
fraudulent concealment and exceptional circumstances prongs of 
the discovery rule. 
B. The Appellees Concealed Horn's Discrimination Cause 
Of Action. 
The discovery rule should be applied in this case because 
the Appellees concealed Horn's discrimination cause of action.2 
Here, the Appellees took affirmative steps to conceal the facts 
underlying Horn's cause of action for perceived handicap 
discrimination. "In such a situation, a plaintiff can avoid the 
full operation of the discovery rule by making a prima facie 
showing of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrating that 
given the Defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not 
have discovered the claim earlier." Berenda v. Langford, 914 
P.2d at 51 (citations omitted). This 
requires a determination of (i) when a plaintiff would 
reasonably be on notice to inquire into a defendant's 
wrongdoing despite the defendant's efforts to conceal it; 
and (ii) whether a plaintiff, once on notice, would 
reasonably have, with due diligence, discovered the facts 
forming the basis of the cause of action despite the 
defendant's efforts to conceal those facts. 
Jd. at 52. As the Berenda court noted, such a determination is 
not a simple as it seems.3 Id. 
2
 The Appellees failed to address the "exceptional 
circumstances" prong of the discovery rule. The Appellant would 
direct the Court's attention to his principle brief for argument 
on this point. 
3
 The want of simplicity in these circumstances warrants a 
reversal of summary judgment on this issue in this case: 
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Here the Appellees did affirmatively conceal that one of the 
motivating factors for the adverse actions against Horn was a 
perceived mental disability. No reference was made to any such 
perception in the notice of termination. R. 492-93, 494-98. 
Further, no indication of this discrimination was made evident in 
the Appellant's discovery responses filed in the companion 
federal case. Moreover, the discovery responses were served upon 
the Appellants on November 15, 1991. See Addendum to Brief of 
Appellant. The Appellants did not file their responses to those 
discovery requests until May 15, 1993, more than one and one-half 
years later! Further, the answers were only filed after Horn 
sought the assistance of the court via a motion to compel. These 
answers did not set forth the facts which would support Horn's 
cause of action, despite the fact that Horn requested that all 
reasons for his termination be disclosed. This concealment took 
place despite the fact that the perceived mental disability was a 
motivating factor, if not one of the primary reasons, for Horn's 
termination. R. 363, 494-98, 552-554, 588, 605. Horn then 
started the process to take the depositions of the critical 
When a defendant has concealed a plaintiff's cause of 
action, the questions of when a plaintiff should reasonably 
begin inquiring about the defendant's wrongdoing and 
whether, once on notice, the plaintiff has acted with 
reasonable diligence to discover the facts forming the basis 
of the cause of action are all highly fact-dependent legal 
questions. ... we explicitly acknowledge that weighing the 
reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in light of the 
defendant's steps to conceal the cause of action 
necessitates the type of factual findings which preclude 
summary judgment in all but the clearest of cases. 
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d at 53-54. 
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witnesses in the federal case. Horn attempted to take the 
critical depositions in November of 1993. See Letter from L. 
Zane Gill to Mark Ward dated October 12, 1993 attached in an 
Addendum hereto. The depositions did not take place at that time 
in order to accommodate the Appellees and their counsel. When 
the depositions did take place, Horn finally discovered the 
illegal discrimination on the part of the Appellees. At this 
point in time, Horn was put on inquiry that one of the grounds for 
his termination was a perception that he was mentally disabled. 
This was in July and August of 1994. After completing further 
investigation, Horn filed his amended complaint on March 6, 1995 
adding a claim for perceived handicap discrimination. This cause 
of action was lodged with the court less than one year after its 
discovery. Thus, once put on notice of the possible existence of 
a cause of action for perceived handicap discrimination, i.e. 
"circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on 
inquiry [,]" Horn was diligent in getting the matter before the 
Court.4 Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 920 P.2d at 579 
4
 Hom's diligence is demonstrated by his efforts to move 
his federal litigation forward. See Addendum to Brief of 
Appellant. Horn timely filed his lawsuit. Horn submitted discovery 
requests. Horn took the depositions of the critical witnesses. 
Horn obtained a default judgment against the Appellees. If anyone 
is to blame for the delay in the discovery of the facts 
underlying Hom's discrimination cause of action, it is the 
Appellees themselves. The Appellees took more than two years to 
file an answer to Hom's complaint. The Appellees took an 
inordinate amount of time to respond to Hom's discovery requests. 
The Appellees failed to disclose all of the reasons for Hom's 
termination. It was the Appellees' lack of diligence in this 
matter that prevented Horn from learning the truth about his 
termination. Horn should not be punished for the lack of 
perseverance on the part of Appellees. 
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(citations omitted). 
The trial court committed error when it found that the 
discovery rule did not apply to toll the running of the statute 
of limitations in this case. Horn did not know, nor could he have 
discovered the facts underlying his discrimination cause of 
action in order to commence the action within the statutory time 
period. The Appellees concealed that they perceived Horn as 
having a mental disability. The Appellees further concealed that 
this perception was one of the grounds for Horn's termination. 
Horn only learned of the true motivations for his termination 
during the deposition testimony of critical witnesses in July and 
August 1994. Upon being put on notice, Horn investigated and 
promptly amended his complaint. Therefore, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment against Horn 
on this issue. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED THE APPELLANT'S 
CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BECAUSE THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP WAS CONTRACTUAL IN NATURE. 
It is Horn's contention that he was employed by the State of 
Utah pursuant to an express contract the terms and conditions of 
which were supplied by statute and rules and regulations. These 
written instruments comprise the express terms of Horn's 
employment relationship with the State of Utah. Thus, because 
Horn's relationship is contractual rather than statutory, a six 
year statute of limitations applies. Horn's breach of contract 
claim and his breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing claim were timely filed within that six year period. 
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The Appellees make reference to other jurisdictions who have 
considered the issue now pending before this Court. The cases 
cited by the Appellees indicate that these jurisdictions have 
concluded that public service employment is statutory and not 
contractual. However, as noted by all parties involved, this 
precise issue has not been determined by the courts of this 
state. 
It is the Appellant's contention that a finding that the 
nature of the relationship between the State and its civil 
service employees as contractual would be logical and premised 
upon existing precedent. See e.g. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 
892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995) (affirming finding that the County had 
breached its employment contract with Thurston); Newcomb v. Ogden 
City Public School Teachers' Retirement Comm'n, 243 P.2d 941 
(Utah 1952) (recognizing that statutes and ordinances become part 
of the employee's contract of employment, i.e. that they are 
incorporated as terms and conditions of the contract of 
employment between the public employer and the public employee). 
Therefore, the Appellant respectfully requests that the Court, in 
its careful consideration, rule that the character of the 
relationship between a public employer and its "civil service" 
employees is contractual in nature. 
III. APPELLEES CANNOT RAISE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES AS AN ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS FOR AFFIRMING THE 
DISMISSAL, GIVEN THE FAILURE OF THE APPELLEES TO 
PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 
The Appellees raise the issue of the Appellant's failure to 
exhaust his administrative remedies in their Brief of Appellees. 
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See Brief of Appellees footnotes 3, 6, and page 25. This issue 
was not raised before the Court below, and therefore, this Court 
is precluded form reviewing the Appellees' failure to exhaust 
argument. 
It is a well established principle of law that "a party must 
raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its right to 
litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings." Brinkerhoff v. 
Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In order 
11
 [t] o preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first 
raise the issue before the trial court." Hart v. Salt Lake 
County Comm'n, 945 P. 2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Such 
issues must be raised before the trial court as it is the "proper 
forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis" of 
issues. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In fact, by failing to raise the issue below, the Appellees' have 
f,denie[d] the trial court xthe opportunity to make any findings 
of fact or conclusions of law' pertinent to the claimed error." 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting 
LaBaron & Assoc, v. .Rebel Enter., 823 P. 2d 479, 483 n. 6 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991)). 
The principle of preservation for appeal has been examined 
at length by Utah's appellate courts. Two examples can be found 
in Condas v. Condast 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980) and Hart v. Salt 
Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In 
Condas, certain statements of deceased witnesses were admitted at 
trial. On appeal, the party opposing the admission of these 
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statements argued that the other party had failed to offer proof 
at trial that the witnesses were unavailable to testify. The 
Court rejected this argument and found that because the party had 
failed to object to the admission of the statements at trial, 
that the party had therefore waived its right to challenge the 
issue on appeal. Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d at 495. 
In Hart, the County raised an issue on appeal that was not 
sufficiently presented to the trial court. In Hart, the County 
argued on appeal that it did not owe a duty to Hart under the 
public duty doctrine. Hart argued that the issue had not been 
preserved for appeal and therefore could not be considered by the 
Court. The County, however, argued that it had preserved the 
issue by objecting to a particular jury instruction.5 In ruling 
that the County had not preserved the issue for appeal, the Court 
of Appeals noted that the County had objected to the jury 
instruction on the basis insufficient evidence. "Such an 
objection is not sufficiently specific to raise the County's 
argument that it did not owe Hart a duty because such an 
objection would not raise the issue 'to a level of consciousness 
such that the trial judge could consider it.'" Hart v. Salt Lake 
County Comm'n, 945 P.2d at 130-31 (quoting State v. Brown, 856 
P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted)). 
5
 The jury instruction specifically dealt with Hart's 
allegations of negligence against the County and with what the 
jury must find in order to return a verdict in favor of Hart. 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d at 13 0. 
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With these principles and cases in mind, it is clear that 
this Court should not consider the Appellees7 failure to exhaust 
claim. The Appellees' have not demonstrated where in the record 
they preserved this issue below.6 Further, the Appellees have 
not stated any basis for considering an unpreserved issue. See 
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(5)(B). Thus, the Court should not consider 
the Appellees' exhaustion argument as an alternative grounds to 
affirm the dismissal of the Appellant's complaint. 
IV. APPELLEES CANNOT ASSERT FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF 
CLAIM AS GROUNDS FOR AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL BELOW. 
In footnote 9 of their Brief of Appellees, the Appellees 
assert an alternative ground for affirming the dismissal below. 
The Appellees argue that the Appellant's claims are barred by the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See UTAH CODE ANN.. §§ 63-30-1 et 
seq. This argument is two pronged. First, the Appellees 
maintain that the Appellant failed to file a Notice of Claim. 
This simply is not accurate. Not only did the Appellant file a 
6
 The Appellees make a token mention of exhaustion in their 
reply memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment. 
However, this mention does not refer to the Appellant's case nor 
does it rise to the level necessary that the trial court was 
afforded the opportunity to rule on the issue. In order for the 
trial court to have been afforded the opportunity to rule on this 
issue, several things must be demonstrated. "First, the issue 
must be raised in a timely fashion. ... Second, the issue must be 
specifically raised, ... such that the issue is sufficiently 
raised to a xlevel of consciousness' before the trial court[. ] 
... Third, the party must introduce to the trial court 
'supporting evidence or relevant legal authority; to support its 
argument." Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d at 130 
(citations omitted). 
The Appellees did not accomplish any of these requirements 
and this court should decline to further address the Appellees' 
exhaustion argument. 
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Notice of Claim, but said Notice of Claim was specifically denied 
by the State of Utah. R. 1087-1111, 1086. Second, the Appellees 
argue that immunity has not been waived as to the circumstances 
of this case. As with the Appellees' exhaustion argument, this 
argument was not preserved for appeal. See Point III supra. The 
parties never briefed this issue.7 Thus, this Court should 
decline to consider this issue in any fashion whatsoever. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and on the arguments presented in 
the Brief of Appellant, the Appellant respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the decision of the trial court and that this 
Court remand this case back to the trial court for a trial on the 
merits. + 
DATED AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this U? * day of March, 
1998. 
7
 In fact, it was not until shortly before trial in this 
case that the Appellees deemed the employment relationship in 
this case to be statutory rather than contractual. Indeed, the 
Appellees had acknowledged that the Appellant's employment 
relationship with the Department of Public Safety was 
contractual. Thus, there was never a question of whether 
immunity had been waived or not. 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT was served, via first class 
mail, postage prepaid, upon the following: 
Debra J. Moore, Esq. 
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Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellees 
P.O. Box 140856 
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DATED this if. day of March, 1998 
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ADDENDUM 
FAX TRANSMITTAL FORM 
Law Office of L. Zane Gill 
215 South State Street, Suite 545 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone:(801) 355-2600 
FAX: (801) 355-2606 
TO: J . Mark Ward 
FROM: L. Zane Gill / ^ ^ 
DATE: October 12, 1993 
SUBJECT: Horn v. Squires et all - Deposition Schedule 
FAX SENT TO THIS NUMBER: 530-4916 
Message: 
I have tried to reach you and you have tried to get back to me. At least wi th 
this message you wil l know what I want. 
I propose to take the following depositions at the times and dates indicated. 
Call me to adjust schedules. I will be on my honeymoon from Friday, October 15, 
1993 through Monday, October 25, 1993. As for your taking Mr. Horn's deposition, 
he is very concerned that his taking any time during the normal work week will cost 
him his job. He is in New Mexico and might be able to come to Salt Lake on a 
weekend to have his depo taken. I can work with that if it is OK wi th you. 
We wil l most likely need to submit a stipulation or letter to the judge to make 
him aware that we are spilling over the discovery cut off date. 
Michael Horn v. Squires et al. 
Deposition List 
Notice Only: 
1. Roland Squires 4hrs 4 
2. Art Hudachko 4hrs 5 
4hrs 6 
2hrs 7 
? 
3. 
Subpoena: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Douglas Bordrero 
Rich Townsend 
Judy Sorensen (?) 
Sheri Stark 
Cheri Ertel 
Bart Blackstock 
2hrs 9 
4hrs 1 
3hrs 8 
6. Harold Carpenter (?) ? 
7. Kuang-Po Lee 4hrs 2 
8. Dan Taylor 2hrs 3 
» * * • # » * * * • * # # * » » * * # » 
3 1/2 days 
Available Days: 
November 3 Ertel am Lee pm 
November 4 Taylor am Squires am 
November 5 pm Hudachko 
November 8 Bordrero am Townsend pm Blackstock pm 
November 9 Stark am 
November nJ 
November 11 
November 
T RAI &\A ISSI ON VEP1FI CAT 1011 REPORT 
TIME 
NAME 
FAX 
TEL 
1U/11'1 1998 } 3: 09 
CASTLE GILL OFFICE 
8013552806 
SGI 531181b 
DATE,TIME 
FAX NO./NAME 
DURATION 
PAGECS) 
RESULT 
MODE 
1 vj ••' I -j 1 :'.: H : : 
5 304911-
00:Mi;uy 
63 
OK 
STANDARD 
